
Lifeboat and Rescue Boat Accidents. Design Failures (3)
As a continuation of the conclusions reached in the previous two articles[1] in this study we will examine a possible triggering cause of the accident that occurred on February 10, 2013, on the ship “Thomson Majesty,” docked at the port of Santa Cruz de la Palma, while conducting lifeboat drills.
For the proposed study, the sequences of the accident are analyzed following what is described in the Final Report “MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT 05/2014”[2]. The working hypothesis is proposed solely for analysis and research purposes in the professional and academic field.
The conclusion reached in the Final Report establishes that the cause of the lifeboat's fall was severe internal corrosion of the suspension cable at the point of failure. An interesting list of conditions that were decisive for the cable's breakage is also added.
The account of the accident states that when the cable of the rigging over the bow davit broke, the boat swung back and forth, remaining suspended for a few seconds by the aft rigging cable, and then, upon the release of the suspension hook, the connecting ring was freed and fell into the sea. The Final Investigation Report states that there is no certainty about whether the FPDs (Fall Prevention Devices) were installed or not.
The following are transcribed pages 12 and 13 of the Final Report, originally in English. It is necessary to include the translation as the account of the events is considered a key piece of the arguments presented to propose the working hypothesis. Only the images, or parts of them, deemed of interest for reading are copied. The numbering contained in the Final Report is maintained.
1.8.2 The accident.- The safety officer stood at the hoisting position (Figure 5: Hoist position) and hoisted the lifeboat. The lifeboat was raised to a position where the bowsing tackles could be re-attached. This was successfully done, but when lowering the lifeboat to bring it level to the embarkation deck, he found that the aft tackle was too slack to bring the lifeboat safely alongside. The lifeboat had to be hoisted again to further adjust the aft bowsing tackle.
2 The safety officer re-hoisted the lifeboat and just as the blocks had engaged with the davit head and the davit arms had started to move upwards (Figure 6), the forward wire rope fall parted (Figure 7). The lifeboat then swung through around 45° and as the weight of the lifeboat was taken by the aft wire rope, the transom of the lifeboat and the aft lifting hook failed. The lifeboat dropped about 20 m, landing upside down in the water. The time of the accident, as recorded by the vessel’s Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), footage was 1154.
1.8.2 The accident.- The safety officer who was next to the control panel (Figure 5) recovered the lifeboat. The lifeboat was turned to a position where the approaching tackles could be secured. This maneuver was successfully performed, but when turning to bring the lifeboat to the level of the embarkation deck, he found that the aft approaching tackle was too slack to safely dock the lifeboat alongside. The lifeboat had to be turned again to adjust the aft approaching tackle.
The safety officer re-hoisted the lifeboat and just as the block connected with the head of the davit and the arm of the davit began to fold inward (Figure 6), the forward wire rope fall parted (Figure 7). The lifeboat then swung back and forth and turned approximately 45° and as the weight of the lifeboat was transferred to the aft wire rope, it broke the transom along with the hook. The lifeboat fell from about 20 meters, landing in the water upside down. The time of the accident, according to the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) was at 1154.
WORKING HYPOTHESIS
Having presented the events that we consider key for the analysis of the accident in search of another possible determining cause of the cable breakage, in the following paragraphs we summarize the criteria considered:
a) It is generally accepted that accidents do not have a single cause. The concatenation of different circumstances leads to the final outcome.
b) Considering that upon boarding the boat at 1100 hours, it would have been well docked alongside, one must ask why it was not docked again after aborting the maneuver, turning the boat, securing the approaching tackle, and turning again to bring it alongside and disembark the crew. Probably the marks on the tackle were not taken into account, which is a common practice.
c) The davits of boat number 9 apparently suffered no damage. The forward block was lost during the accident (probably falling into the sea). The aft block can be seen in image 5 of the Final Report, so the hook opened due to the violence of the impact. In figure number 12 of the Final Report, the open hook can be seen, probably due to the violence of the blow when all the weight rested on it, tearing and deforming the structure of the transom to which it was attached.
d) In figure 12 of the Final Report previously mentioned, the mark (red circle) of the locking pin (FPD) apparently removed can also be seen, and it cannot be determined whether it was like this before or after the accident since the Final Report states that it is unknown whether the boat crew mounted the FPDs before starting the recovery maneuver. This may explain why the aft hook opened when the boat detached after the forward cable broke. Since the release system (forward and aft hooks and actuation device) is generally connected to a central lever for synchronized operation, when the aft one opened due to the violence of transferring all the weight of the boat and inertia on it, it also opened the forward one (once again we can refer to hook failure with release under tension although these had locking pins) and consequently detaching and losing the forward block. The reason for the apparent absence of the locking pins may have been that when close to the water surface (waiting for a hydraulic system failure), ready to float and open the hooks in the no-tension mode (locking pins removed), they remained unmounted. At the moment the maneuver was aborted, they did not realize that they needed to mount them to ensure that they would not open during recovery. If the locking pins had been mounted, it is possible that the boat, after breaking the forward cable, would have remained suspended by the aft cable, assuming that the hook's attachment to the boat's structure would have held, just as happened in the accident of the ship “Volendam”[3] where the boat was left hanging from the aft davit cable.
e) As described in c) after the accident, the aft block remained fixed at the joint with the head of the davit.
In the previous image, from the blog of journalist Juan Carlos Díaz Lorenzo[4], it can be seen that the forward davit is more lowered than the aft one. This is explained because when the cable broke, the arm of the forward davit fell by gravity to its maximum range. However, the aft one remained fixed in the position corresponding to the moment of the cable break. Full coincidence with the description of the accident.
f) To establish this hypothesis, we assume that the grounded cable, the firm one, is the one on the outside of the forward davit.
The section of cable shown in the cropped photograph in image 10 of the Final Report is the one on the inner side, which is redirected to the winch drum. Considering that the described was the arrangement of the simple pulley rigging in this model of davits, we can conclude that, once the arm of the davit was lowered, the pulleys on the outer side remained fixed (not rotating) since the cable does not work through them.
g) It is likely that once the maneuver was aborted, securing the approaching cables, in trying to bring the boat alongside to disembark its eight occupants (as described, the boat was a little separated from the side), it is understandable (not good practice) that they continued to turn until confirming that the aft of the boat was not docking alongside. While trying to bring the aft of the boat alongside the ship, the forward cable unwound at the same time as the aft one, so it is possible that the boat was suspended from the approaching rigging, either fully or partially, but enough for the cable to become slack, which could have caused it to misalign from the pulley, mounting the edge of it (coming out of the throat) at the end of the davit. When it was confirmed that the boat was not docking at the aft despite continuing to turn, it was decided to turn again to rectify the length of the approaching tackles. At that moment, when the weight of the boat returned to the cables, the one on the grounded side snagged on or over the edge of the pulley, remaining motionless, static in that position, until the block connected with the head of the davit and the davit began to fold inward, the pulley began to rotate counterclockwise, shearing the cable. What is described is a possibility that corresponds with the sequences listed in Final Report 1.8.2 The accident.
h) Obviously, the cable had corrosion and lack of lubricant which contributed, first, to jumping the pulley and second to breaking when pressed and/or sheared between the sheave and the cable guard, leaving one of the ends broken as seen in the following image, where the arm of the forward davit shows the broken cable. Safety Alert.[5]
The pulley seen in the foreground of the referred image, at the head of the arm of the davit may have been the cause of the break acting as a shear. The difference in the cable that is seen is the one corresponding to the fall of the arm of the davit once the cable broke, as it was left without any support. This analysis is valid as long as the end of the cable observed corresponds to that redirected to the winch drum, which is not clearly seen in the available graphic information. The section of cable that is missing, the one on the outer side of the arm of the davit, visible in the previous image, should correspond to the grounded one, which due to its own weight came out of the pulleys at the moment of the cut, falling onto the deck.
i) In image 18 of the Final Report, the area is indicated where, according to the investigation, the part of the cable break remained with the davits folded. More precisely, it is said that it coincided with the innermost pulley, but without precisely delimiting the position of the break. If it had been determined precisely, bringing the arm of the forward davit to a position similar to that of the aft, and if the break coincided with the mentioned pulley, we could have had a very enlightening data. It is necessary to question this point, under the premise that the cable on the inner face of the arm of the davit is the one that goes to the winch drum. If what is described corresponds to the design of this model, and the break of the cable occurred where they indicate, the end of the broken cable would have remained hanging from the forward pulley. However, in the available images, the cut end of the cable remains mounted on the pulley on the inner side of the head of the arm of the davit.
In the stowage position of the davits, it is quite probable that the point of the cable cut coincided with an area where saltpeter could have accumulated, otherwise the excess corrosion and lack of internal lubrication of the cable at the break point is not justified. This detail of maintenance and inspection of cables is contemplated in the review of Chapter III of SOLAS, recommending to intensify the inspection of cables as they pass or rest on pulleys, as was recorded in the second part of this series of articles.
j) From the documentation available in the Final Report, it should be noted that the cables were calculated to withstand a weight in the launch with 150 people of 23,250 k. For recovery with four people, the estimated weight was 12,300 k. 8 to which must be added (4x75) 300 k of the 8 people on board the boat at the time of the break. The cables, according to the Certificate, had an SWL of 306.3 kN (31.2 t). The breaking test of the sample in the laboratory was 263.1 kN (26.8 t). This data is significant when determining a break due to tension. In a cable with two years of use and the characteristics determined in laboratory tests, including the area of the break, it is difficult to attribute the failure and breakage solely to excess tension. In the worst case, there were two cables with an approximate capacity of 25 t each for a total estimated recovery weight of about 13 t.
k) For the reasons stated, it is necessary to study and add another factor that contributed or could have been the determining cause of the accident: Exit of the cable from the throat of the pulley on the outer side of the head of the arm of the forward davit due to misalignment from lack of tension. The cable became trapped between the edge of the pulley at the head of the davit and the cable guard. When the block reached the head of the davit, the folding of the arm began at the same time as the pulley on which the grounded cable works began to rotate counterclockwise. A shear effect could have been created, cutting the cable in the area where it was held. The degree of corrosion in that area facilitated the shearing.
Many of the davits equipped on ships today have pulleys at the end of the arm of the davit of the indicated type, with different protection systems to prevent misalignment and the cable jumping out of the throat of the pulley. It is necessary to study this risk in the academic and industrial field, as well as to alert professionals in the sector to take it into account during maintenance and drills with lifeboats.
Notes
[1] GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ, R.: Magazine Captain no. 25 II/2014 and no. 27 II/2015. CANARY ACADEMY OF NAVIGATION SCIENCES. “Accidents with lifeboats and rescue boats. Design failures”. (First and Second part)
[2] MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 05/2014. Safety investigation into the failure of a lifeboat wire rope fall on board the Maltese registered passenger ship THOMSON MAJESTY. 201302/008. Annexes from A to K.
[3] Passenger vessel “Volendam”, lifeboat fatality, port of Lyttelton, New Zealand, January 8, 2011.
[4] https://delacontecerportuario.wordpress.com/tag/thomson-majesty/ Blog by Juan Carlos Díaz Lorenzo, DEL ACONTECER MARITIMO “A routine maneuver on the ship Thomson Majesty ends in tragedy. February 10, 2013.
[5] MSIU SAFETY ALERT 01/2013. Failure on lifeboat wire fall due to corrosion that resulted in five fatalities on the Maltese registered passenger vessel THOMSON MAJESTY.








