Considerations Regarding the Tanker 'Prestige' Incident

In this catastrophe, as in others, such as the cases of the tankers “Amoco Cádiz”, “Castillo de Bellver” and others that Captain Carlos Peña Alvear cites in his lecture “The case of the tanker ‘Prestige’, seen by a captain of the Spanish merchant navy”, the complexity of the maritime business and its fascination is once again highlighted. As we well know, whenever a catastrophe occurs with characteristics like those documented and detailed by the speaker, several circumstances tend to converge or accumulate, which chained together often end with such disastrous results.

To this case, a new factor should be added: the political one, or rather, the political struggles that have been and are being profitably managed by the parties involved, and whose consequences will be partially suffered by the Spanish taxpayer. I completely agree that in this case, as in many others, the captain is a victim or, better said, a scapegoat for the faults of others. To the point that the prosecution, when requesting a penalty for the captain, which includes imprisonment, ends up saying something like: “But the captain should not remain a single day in jail.” Clearly stating in a manifest way that this man is a poor victim of circumstances, and there are not few.

-Double standards of Classification Societies in their actions as representatives of flag countries, issuing Statutory Certificates, or in other words: of maximum responsibility regarding the navigability and safety of the vessel. Or conducting inspections for the owner, in this case as “CLIENT”, for the continuous assessments of the vessel. A practice that, while legal, may be deemed somewhat illicit.

– Crews with dubious qualifications or competency certificates that are easily acquired.

– Irresponsible shipowners or in some cases subject to severe economic crises that force them to minimize expenses on care and maintenance.

– Relaxation by some maritime authorities, at an international level, in their supervisory duties and demands for standards and statutes. (I reside in a model port in this regard).

– Insurance companies that do not know how to adequately defend their interests, for example, lacking truthful and reliable information about the condition of the vessels they insure, which would allow them to penalize or increase premiums and deductibles based on their condition, such as corrosion and loss of thickness, equipment and machinery in poor condition, inadequate crews, etc., etc. Thus avoiding that certain bad practices exercised by unscrupulous “exploiters of ships” become unprofitable. I reserve the term shipowner for serious shipowners, of which there are some - today fewer - whom we know or have known.

The publication of the second part of the excellent work by the experienced captain Carlos Peña Alvear continues to open the doors of opinion for those of us who are concerned about the fascinating world of the Merchant Navy. A few more considerations. I would like to add to what I pointed out days ago about the matter; perhaps more with speculative intent than to clarify such a controversial fact as large maritime accidents generally are.

The large number of actors involved in these types of catastrophes, both as responsible parties and experts and judges; combined with the enormous conflicts of interest that arise from them, do not make it easy, even for the most conscientious experts, to achieve complete clarification. If we add to this the passions or political struggles, the cocktail is served.

It would be pretentious of me to assert that, in this case, the optimal solution would have been to take the ship to port or shelter. I imagine that at that moment those who had to decide, following their good judgment and understanding, took the solution that they believed was most convenient in such a difficult situation and with the information they had. Those of us who are fans of bullfighting know well that practicing in the ring never poses a danger to the practitioner; while a master who enters the arena is always exposed to the dangers of the bull, especially the greater his interest in “perfecting” the performance. After a troubled maneuver, one can always analyze where the master failed; especially if the video immortalized it.

In the tanker “Prestige” there was no video, although apparently, there was a report issued by an experienced and daring expert. Those who have had the opportunity to read it say it is quite enlightening regarding the state of the machinery and the difficulties encountered when providing assistance and help for the reactivation maneuvers prior to the start-up, before the maneuver of distancing.

In these cases, it often happens that the salvage company is more concerned with assisting with its means than allowing the ship to use its own. This is a constant in this type of business, more focused on the profitability of the company than on minimizing damage. An example is the case of “Amoco Cádiz”, where for eleven long hours the captain and the “towed” tug “Pacific” were embroiled in a discussion about the towing conditions until the ship ran aground, contaminating 360 kilometers of French coasts. This led to changes in some regulations and rules. Changes, on the other hand, as is usual in the sector, have more punitive and exemplary character than preventive for future possible cases. It was speculated at the time that another discordant element appeared in this catastrophe: the “chirlaras”; an aberrant and mischievous practice exercised in some shipyards during welding work, which sometimes went unnoticed during inspections by Classification Societies, shipowners, and administration.

By the way, when talking about Administration, it should be noted that in Spain, Ship Inspections often face heavy workloads with endless hours, poorly paid, scarce staff, limited or nonexistent technical means, strong pressures and/or threats. Working under such conditions in a job of such high responsibility must not be particularly gratifying. Moreover, in many cases, the State Attorney's Office disregards or minimizes its work in favor of defending the State or the responsible politician.

Regarding Classification Societies, their functions and practices, much could be said. In the case of “Prestige”, whose care and inspection in the dual aspect of the flag country's Administration and as a Classification Society is evident, they must have much to say and respond regarding possible failures, latent defects, or breakdowns.

With respect to the responsibilities of the charterer, it is known that these are determined by the conditions of the charter policy; if it is a “time charter”, they are null or scarce regarding the responsibilities for the maintenance of the vessel, which, as we know, belong to the shipowner. In the case of a “bareboat charter”, as is known, these responsibilities do fall on the charterer. Therefore, it is very important that when receiving a vessel under this type of contract, what the “papers” (certificates) say must match the actual condition of the vessel. This does not always happen, as deceptions and cover-ups are often the common factor between parties; especially if shipowners and charterers have their ghost companies based in tax havens and vessels registered under flags of convenience. And why not say it, putting the vessel, in many cases, in the hands of complicit crews of their misdeeds. This complicity breaks when the unscrupulous shipowner or charterer abandons them to their fate in a port or court of a distant country.

As the wise and unfortunate José Luis Rodriguez Carrión would say:

-Juan, this is a disaster…

(*) Chief Engineer of the Spanish Merchant Navy

Links to the lecture by Captain Carlos Peña Alvear, titled “The case of the tanker ‘Prestige’, seen by a captain of the Spanish Merchant Navy”: Part I and Part II

Photo: Maritime Salvage